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Abstract
Consumers make mistakes when facing complex purchasing decision problems but
if at least some consumers choose only among offers that are easy to compare with oth-
ers then ﬁrms will adopt common ways to present their offers and thus make choice
easier (Gaudeul and Sugden, 2011). We design an original experiment to identify con-
sumers’ choice heuristics in the lab. Subjects are presented with menus of offers and
do appear to favour offers that are easy to compare with others in the menu. While not
all subjects do so, this is enough to deter ﬁrms from introducing spurious complexity in
the way they present products.
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decisions but still make mistakes when facing complex purchasing decision problems. Low
levels of consumer literacy and numeracy even in advanced economies make it very difﬁ-
cult for broad swathes of the population to understand how to make adequate decisions in
many situations, such as when choosing how much to save for retirement, when selecting
healthcare insurance, when investing in stock markets, when comparing car or computer
models, etc. (Agarwal and Mazumder, 2010; Ayal, 2011; Bar-Gill and Stone, 2009; Lusardi,
2008; Lusardi et al., 2010; Miravete, 2003; Wilson and Price, 2010). Knowing this, ﬁrms may
beneﬁt from introducing spurious complexity in their contract offerings, and thus deliber-
ately obfuscate consumer choice (Carlin, 2009; Chioveanu and Zhou, 2009; DellaVigna and
Malmendier, 2006; Ellison, 2005; Ellison and Ellison, 2009; Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Pic-
cione and Spiegler, 2010; Miravete, 2011).
Adams(1997)referstosectorsinwhichsuchﬁrmsoperateas“confusopolies”. Hedeﬁnes
this as “a group of companies with similar products who intentionally confuse consumers
instead of competing on price”. Sectors in which those ﬁrms operate include telephone
services, insurance, mortgage loans, banking, ﬁnancial services, electricity, etc. In all those
sectors, ﬁrms sell a relatively homogeneous product and so would make low proﬁts if they
did not introduce spurious differentiation in their offerings. This undermines consumers’
ability to make informed choices about their services and products.
Gaudeul and Sugden (2011) assert that if at least some consumers limit their choices to
those offers that are easily comparable then ﬁrms will be forced into simplifying their of-
fers and adopting common standards, thus competing à la Bertrand based on their genuine
product characteristics. Offerings that are easily comparable are said to adhere to a com-
mon standard (“CS”)1. The “common standard rule” consists in favoring those. The way this
rule fosters competition among ﬁrms is called the “common standard effect”. This effect
is similar to that evoked by Scitovsky (1950) when he mentioned that “it is only the expert
buyer who insists on comparing rival products before every purchase; and it is only his in-
sistence on making comparisons that forces the seller - or rather makes it proﬁtable for him
- to make his product easily comparable to competing products.”
The concept of a “standard” in our setting is essentially the same as what others call a
“frame”, that is, to paraphrase Spiegler (2011, p.151), an aspect of a product’s presentation
that is of no relevance to a consumer’s utility and yet affects his ability to make comparisons
among alternatives. This can be a price format, a “language” in which a contract is written,
but also a unit of measurement, a way of packaging a product, a technical standard, etc...
Note that ﬁrms adopting a common standard in the way in which they present their
offers do not inherently make those offers less complex to understand. That is, a CS offer
when standing on its own will not be easier to evaluate than an offer that is presented in
terms of an individuated standard (“IS”). It is only in its relation with other offers that a CS
1An index of abbreviations and notations is provided in appendix A.
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PowerPC processors to Intel x86 processors in 2006 did not make the performance of Apple
computers easier to evaluate, but it did make it easier to compare with the performance of
most other computers. Our argument is thus not an argument about complexity, but about
comparability. Note also that the common standard effect will come into play as soon as
some of the aspects of competing products are comparable, that is, it does not require that
competing products be comparable across all of their characteristics.
Thecommonstandardrule(“CSrule”)isaruleofthumbthatconsumersmayuseintheir
selection of which product to buy. However, this rule of thumb is the result of an optimizing
process, that is, it is rational as long as there is little difference between products and in
the prior beliefs of consumers on the value of each ﬁrms’ offering. As we will see later, it
derives strength from its simplicity, has strong behavioural foundations and can be applied
in many settings, thus ensuring its evolutionary robustness. Contributing to the later, there
is no need for others to follow it for it to be optimal.
We wish in this paper to determine if some consumers indeed follow such a “common
standard rule”. Since data from the ﬁeld would be insufﬁcient for our purpose, we design
an experiment to identify what choice heuristics consumers follow when faced with simple
choice situations. Subjects are asked to buy paint to cover a ﬁxed area, known and the same
for all, and are presented with menus of offerings, each offer being a price and the area the
paint can cover for that price. The area is presented in different shapes (circles, triangles
and squares) of different sizes. The offers’ unit prices are thus difﬁcult to assess correctly
(Krider et al., 2001), but offers that are of the same shape and size (of the same “standard”)
areeasytocompare. Weﬁndthatoursubjectsdifferintheirabilitytomakeaccuratechoices
from the menus presented to them but that they generally make better choices (in terms of
payoffs) when a menu includes a common standard than when it does not. We observe that
many consumers appear to favour the lowest priced of the CS offers (“LPCS”), meaning that
theychooseitmoreoftenthanifithadnotadheredtotheCS.Whilenotallconsumersfollow
theCSheuristic,theirnumberissufﬁcienttoensurethataﬁrmthatwouldmakeLPCSoffers
would make higher proﬁts than ﬁrms not adhering to the common standard, meaning that
ﬁrms have an incentive to adopt a common standard.
Outline: The paper is divided into six sections. We ﬁrst introduce its context by evoking
the debate over what to do about ﬁrms wilfully confusing potentially vulnerable consumers.
A solution could be to let market forces and consumer preferences for common standard
offers eliminate those ﬁrms that follow such tactics. Our literature review covers work that,
like ours, deals with consumer confusion and ﬁrms’ attempts to proﬁt from it. We conclude
that only an experimental approach will allow us to determine if consumer do indeed prefer
common standards. We therefore present an original experimental setting that reproduces
in a simpliﬁed manner the kind of issues consumers may face when choosing among prod-
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of different rules a consumer might follow when making choices. We describe the charac-
teristics of the participants in our experiment and do some exploratory analysis of their de-
cisions, which informs our last section where we deal with the econometric analysis of our
data. Our conclusion summarizes our ﬁndings, underlines their consequences and offers
ideas for further research.
1 Context
Behaviouraleconomicsﬁndsthatconsumershave“inconsistent, contextdependentprefer-
ences” and may not have “enough brainpower to evaluate and compare complicated prod-
ucts”(Spiegler,2011). Theyoftendonotmakethebestchoicesforthemselves,whetherfrom
an external, objective point of view or, more damaging, from their own point of view as well,
that is, “they may fail to choose in accordance with what, after sufﬁcient reﬂection, they
would acknowledge to be their own best interests” (Gaudeul and Sugden, 2011). Not only
do they make what they would themselves consider bad choices, but those choices may
not even make them happy, whether in the short or the long term . Normative economics
asks what ought to be done about it, and differs in its advices. Three schools of thoughts
are particularly salient: The libertarian paternalist approach (Camerer et al., 2003; Thaler
and Sunstein, 2008) lists errors people typically make and suggests ways to get people to do
whattheywouldhaveanywaydoneabsenttheirlimitations. Thewelfaristapproach(Layard,
2005) seeks to maximize consumers’ experienced utility (happiness), possibly manipulating
their choice, of leisure for example, through taxes. The liberal approach argues consumers
ought to be free to choose as they wish and the market free to fulﬁll their needs as they oc-
cur (Sugden, 2004). The ﬁrst school appeals to the concept of a consumer’s “best self”, the
second invokes a consumer’s greater good, and the third defends a consumer’s sovereignty
and freedom of choice.
What would a libertarian paternalist do about ﬁrms that try to confuse consumers with
offers that are difﬁcult to evaluate and compare with the competition?2 An unvarnished pa-
ternalistic approach would be to get ﬁrms to make their offers easier to compare, or limit
choice to those offers that have been determined to be best. There are issues with this ap-
proach: it is rather heavy handed and requires deﬁning standards from the top down, which
may result in too much rigidity and hinder further innovations in a sector. It also supposes
one is conﬁdent that an expert may know better than the consumer, which is doubtful, see
Freedman (2010) for example. A libertarian paternalistic approach would be to make sure
consumers choose the best product without constraining their freedom to make bad deci-
sions as well. Being paternalistic, it suffers from the same problems as above but, relying as
2We did not ﬁnd recommendations on this topic from happiness researchers.
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aware of how his choice is being manipulated while “straight” paternalism at least does not
disguise itself.
Moresatisfying,ifonewantstoinvolveathirdpartyinthesolutionoftheproblem,would
be to educate consumers and provide them with information so they have the tools to make
better choices in a wide variety of settings (Agarwal et al., 2010; Garrod et al., 2008). Better
education in the basic principles of home economics, more particularly consumer science
and resource management, could also be (re-)introduced.
Gaudeul and Sugden (2011), however, argue that all the above is at least in large part
unnecessary as competition ought to drive ﬁrms to simplify their offerings if at least some
consumers follow the common standard rule. Regulatory intervention would thus be limited
to preventing ﬁrms from colluding to keep different formats for their offers. However, their
conclusions hold only if indeed some consumers prefer offers that are expressed in ways
that make them easy to compare with others. The purpose of this paper is to check if such
consumers indeed exist, and if so, if their number is sufﬁcient to drive ﬁrms into making
their offers simpler to compare with others.
At this point, it is helpful to explain further why we concentrate on the study of the com-
mon standard rule. The CS rule is such that not only will consumers avoid the higher priced
of the common standard offers, but they will choose the lower priced of the CS offers (the
“LPCS” offer or “LPCS” for short) and disregard individuated standard (“IS”) offers. There
are many ways in which we can justify this behavior:
1. Statistically,ifoneassumesthatpricesarei.i.d. acrossﬁrmsandﬁrmschoosewhether
to be CS or not at random, then the LPCS has lower prices in expectation than other
ﬁrms. As in the Monty-Hall problem (Friedman, 1998), there is information gained
from being told that an option is dominated.
2. Behaviourally, consumers (human or not, see Latty and Beekman, 2010) have been
shown to be subject to the asymmetric dominance effect (Ariely, 2008, Chapter 1), so
that when faced with three offers, one being dominated by another, that other will
be chosen more often than if the dominated offer was not present. Another way to
call this effect in the ﬁeld of decision theory is the “attraction effect”, which is a type
of context effect (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993). Note however that while the lit-
erature on this topic considers the dominated offer to be irrelevant, it is very much
relevant in our setting as per the statistical argument above.
3. Fromlearning: (GaudeulandSugden,2007)arguethatconsumersarebetteroffchoos-
ing among CS offers when ﬁrms are strategic agents in a competitive setting, subject
to at least some agents following the CS rule. Consumers ought therefore to learn to
behave optimally over time (Sugden, 1986; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). This learn-
ingshouldbemadeeasierbythegeneralapplicabilityofthecommonstandardruleto
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ﬁrms have lower prices on average than other ﬁrms will apply this insight generally.
Note that this does not require that consumers understand why this principle seems
to be effective, and they may in fact rationalize it in other ways than the way we do so
here.
4. For simplicity, as agents faced with complex choices tend to follow simple heuristics,
oftenwithgoodresults(GigerenzerandBrighton,2009)Inthiscase, anofferbeingun-
ambiguously better than another provides “one good reason” to choose it (Gigerenzer
and Goldstein, 1999).
The CS rule, based on multiple foundations, can thus be generalized across many settings
and is likely to be more robust than rules that hold only in some settings, even if in some sit-
uations it is not the best way to make choices (Sugden, 1989). We believe this rule is at work
in a wide variety of consumer choice problems. Its simplicity and intuitive appeal make
it particularly interesting for economists interested in consumer behaviour and heuristics,
marketing, consumer protection and the competitive process.
2 Literature review
There has been a recent increase in interest within the ﬁeld of industrial organisation for
how consumers biases, limitations and inconsistencies can be exploited by ﬁrms (Carlin,
2009; Chioveanu and Zhou, 2009; Ellison, 2005; Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Piccione and
Spiegler, 2010). Ellison (2006) provides a survey of this literature and Spiegler (2011) wrote
an excellent book analysing how boundedly rational consumers affect conclusions from
conventional IO. Yet, Ellison (2006) observed that “in many papers in the IO branch, the
particular form of the departures from rationality is motivated by little more than the au-
thor’s intuition that the departure is plausible” and suggested “more reliance on empirical
and experimental evidence”. Recent research goes into evidence of how ﬁrms might design
their offers to exploit consumers (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006; Ellison and Ellison,
2009; Miravete, 2003, 2011). Experiments are still quite rare however, though the ﬁelds of
marketing (Morwitz et al., 1998; Viswanathan et al., 2005; Zeithaml, 1982) and psychology
(Ariely, 2008; Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Iyengar et al., 2004) have contributed to our un-
derstanding of how consumers deal with products choices in realistic purchasing scenarios.
Economists have also led some experiments, among others Huck and Wallace (2010) and
Shestakova (2011), who consider how different price frames affect consumer choice, and
Kalaycı and Potters (2011), who consider how more complex offers increase ﬁrms proﬁts in
an experimental duopoly setting. We were however particularly inspired by ﬁeld data on
how functionally illiterate consumers make their choices (Viswanathan et al., 2005).
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to navigate complex tariff structures. As Ayal (2011) puts it: “reality shows that when com-
plexity ishigh, consumerstendtoseek decisiontools[...] reducingthedimensionality ofthe
problem, usually through heuristics limiting the number of attributes considered”. Payne
etal.(1993)suggestthisistheresultofaneffort-accuracytradeoffbutGigerenzeretal.(2000)
argue that “less knowledge (can) lead to systematically better predictions than more knowl-
edge”sothatheuristicdecisionmakingcanperformbetterthanstrategiesthatrequiremore
effort and information.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature on confused consumers by relying on
a slightly framed laboratory setting in which values are induced, repeated observations are
possible,thebestchoiceiswelldeﬁnedandconsumermistakesandbiasescanbecontrolled
for. Our setting allows us to deﬁne an exhaustive set of decision rules that subjects may fol-
low when faced with decisions in our experiment. This would not be possible when using
empirical data. Looking at product sales, for example, would introduce various confounds:
the presence of real along with spurious product differentiation; regulations that may im-
pose standards for a variety of reasons; economies of scale and network effects that may
encourage the convergence to a technological standard; reputation concerns that may lead
ﬁrms not to wish to confuse consumers; framing other than the standard adopted by the
offer that may inﬂuence choice as well; habits and tastes such that the consumer chooses a
product based on past purchasing behavior, and so on.
Doing an experiment in the laboratory allows us to study the demand side in isolation of
the supply side, and makes it possible to create genuine spurious complexity, that is, com-
plexity that all consumers will agree should be irrelevant to their choice. We can rule out
regulation, economies of scale, network effects, reputation, habits and other inﬂuences on
the subjects’ choices. Since utility is well deﬁned in our experiment, we can deﬁne precisely
whatisthebestchoiceineachchoicesituationandexcludeheterogeneityinconsumerpref-
erences. However, in order to keep the laboratory experience close to a purchasing act, the
experiment is framed as a real buying decision, in which the participants are asked to buy a
product out of menus of offers with the aim of minimising expenditure.
3 Experimental design
Participantsfacedtwodistinctsetoftasksinourexperiment. Intheﬁrstpart, thecoreofour
experiment, the participants were faced with 80 different menus, each menu consisting of 3
to 6 options, each option being characterised by a set of attributes. Participants were asked
to choose one option within each menu with the aim of minimising their expenditure. The
second part was designed to assess participants’ ability with respect to dimensions of rel-
evance to the decisions they had to make in the ﬁrst part. The participants were asked to
tackle some (non incentivised) standard tasks to assess their ability to compare shape sizes,
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tal software, the menu generator and the script to collect and organise the raw data were
programmed in Python (van Rossum and Drake, 2001).3 The English translation of the orig-
inal German instructions is available in appendix B.
3.1 Purchasing task
The main task consisted of a purchase decision. Consumers were given a budget B and
presented with menus of options, each option being described by its size, shape and price.
More speciﬁcally, the task of the participants was to buy paint to cover a ﬁxed, square area,
and they were presented with offers consisting of a price p and a visual representation of
the area that could be covered for that price. Participants were told that paint quality did
not differ across offers.
Denoting s the size of the area covered by the offer as a proportion of the total area to
be covered (s was always less than 1) their total expense was calculated automatically as
p/s. Their payoff was what they managed to save from their budget B once the paint had
been bought, that is, B ¡p/s; in payoff terms, all the participants had to do was to minimise
their expenditure. The area covered by the offer was presented in different shapes and sizes,
the {shape, size} combination being what we will henceforth call a standard. A common
standard in this setting was an offer that has an equivalent in terms of size and shape in the
menu. In that case, the consumer needed only choose, among the options that adhere to
the common standard, the one that minimizes p.
Presenting offers in terms of a combination of a shape and a size conveys the idea of a
standard while drawing on an existing body of research on shape perceptions (Krider et al.,
2001). It is easier to compare an offer with another if they have the same shape. If two items
have the same shape and the same size, comparison is even easier.
Offers were thus described by three elements:
1. A shape out of three possible options: circle, square, equilateral triangle (see Figure
1). We considered only three shapes to limit confusion and to be able to build on the
existing literature on shape comparisons, which is limited essentially to those basic
shapes (Krider et al., 2001). There was no variations in terms of the positioning of the
shape – always in the center of the background square that represented the total area
to cover, resting on a base in the case of the triangle, resting on a side in the case of the
square.
3Different python modules were needed to develop the experimental software: wxpython was used for the
graphical user interface, and two community-contributed packages, svgﬁg and polygon, were used for creat-
ing and managing the shapes. The experimental software (menu and shape generators and analysers, user
interface) and its documentation, as well as the raw data and the script used to collect and organise them are
available upon request.
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must be covered, these options ranged in size from 10 to 43, in steps of 3 (see Figure
2).4 The step was chosen to be big enough to allow for easy comparison within menus
(at least if areas were of the same shape) while being small enough to have a sufﬁcient
number of steps to rule out learning and comparisons across menus.
3. Aprice, indicatinghowmuchitcoststocovertheareacoveredbytheoffer. Unitprices
(“up”, the cost to cover an area of size 1 as per the normalization above) were drawn
fromauniformdistributionofmean0.5andstandarddeviation¾2 equaltoeither0.05
or 0.01. Standard deviation of 0.05 was meant to represent a case where there is a low
degreeofcompetitionbetweenproducts,whilestandarddeviationof0.01represented
a case with strong competition. The price of an offer, which was the information con-
veyed to the participants, was obtained from the unit price by multiplying it by the
size of area covered by the offer.
Figure 1: The shapes used in the menus
Figure 2: The sizes used in the menus
The offers were displayed as a grey area on a white background. The participants were
toldthat,oncetheychoseanoffer,theywouldobtainfortheshownpriceanamountofpaint
suitable to cover an area equivalent to the shown area. The white background was the total
areatobecovered. Thisallowedparticipantstovisuallyappreciatethesizeoftheshapewith
respect to the total area to be covered. The background was overlaid with a grid of thin light
blue lines to ease comparison between offers.
Menus varied in terms of length (3 or 6 offers per menu) and in terms of strength of
competition between offers (high or low) in order to obtain a two-by-two within-subjects
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(the triangle) is shown in ﬁgure 3. An example of a menu with six elements and no common
standard is shown in Figure 4.
Figure 3: Screenshot of a menu with three offers and a common standard
Figure 4: Screenshot of a menu with six offers and no common standard
Menus were randomly generated with Python under the constraint that no offer was to
give, if chosen, a negative payoff to the participant. Moreover, within this structure, menus
had either no common standard, one common standard or two common standards:
1. Menus with no common standards were such that a given {shape, size} combination
would appear only once within the menu. Note that this requirements does not pre-
vent the same shape from occuring more than once in a given menu, only that a stan-
dard,thatisa{shape,size}combination,doesnotappeartwice. Itisthereforepossible
that menus with no common standard may present what we call soft standards, that
is, menus with two offers of the same shape but different sizes.
2. Menus with one common standard, such that two (and only two) offers featured the
same {shape, size} combination. Those were constrained not to have the same price.
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one {shape, size} combination occurred twice while another occurred thrice.
Each individual was faced with 80 menus. 36 showed three options (“3-menus”), of which
18 with one CS. 44 showed six options (“6-menus”), of which 18 with one CS and 8 with two
CS (one with two members, the other with three). In each case, half of the menus featured
strong competition (variance 0.01), the other half weak competition (variance 0.05). The
distribution of menus is summarized in table 1 below.5
Table 1: Distribution of menus by CS and strength of competition
Strong competition Weak competition
3-menu
No CS 9 9
One CS 9 9
6-menu
No CS 9 9
One CS 9 9
Two CS 4 4
Once an option was chosen, the computer automatically purchased the exact quantity
needed to paint the background square area at the unit price implied by the offer. If the
participant chose an offer of size s and price p, which implied a unit price up Æ p/s/100
then the computer calculated her expenditure of 100¢up and her payoff B ¡100¢up. The
participant was thus best off choosing the option that minimised up.
The participants had up to two minutes to choose an offer from each menu. The choice
was performed by clicking on the shapes - in which case they would be highlighted with
a light green frame - but could be revised as many times as one wanted, within the two
minutes limit, and was ﬁnalised only by clicking on a ’Submit’ button present at the bottom
of the screen (see appendix C). Finalizing a choice could not be done before 10 seconds had
elapsed. If no ﬁnal choice was made within the two minutes limit - that is, the participant
had not clicked on the Submit button - the last highlighted offer was submitted as the ﬁnal
choice; if no offer was highlighted, then the participant would receive a payment of 3 euros
for that trial, which is less than the minimum value of any offer across all our menus.6
The participants were given detailed feedback about their payoff in each period (see Fig-
ure 5). The feedback reminded them of their choice, and told them how much they spent to
covertherequiredarea. Theirpayoffwascommunicatedasendowmentminusexpenditure.
5The menus are available on request for visual inspection. Apart from the visual representation provided
there, the menus are described by lists of three or six 6-elements vectors (shape, size, unit price, shown price,
dummy for soft standard, dummy for standard). These are available in comma separated ﬁles bundled with
the experimental software, and can be sent upon request.
6Only one participant failed to make a decision within the time limit, and this only once, in that case pro-
viding no choice.
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The participants were not given the possibility to automatically store and retrieve their
payoffsfrompreviousrounds,butwereprovidedwithpencilandpaperandmanydidrecord
their payoffs. Once they conﬁrmed the feedback by clicking on ’OK’, they would be shown
the next menu. The participants knew the total number of menus was 80 and reminded of
their progress along the experiment.
3.2 Control tasks and questionnaire
The second part of the experiment consisted of non-incentivised tasks to control for the
ability of the participants in performing the main task (see appendix D). Those tasks relate
to visual perception and computational skills. Three different set of tasks were chosen:
1. Shape comparisons: The participants were asked to give their estimate of the relative
size of a shape with respect to another. The comparisons involved rectangles, circles
and triangles. Each comparison had to be done within a time limit of one minute. No
minimum time was enforced and the participants could skip any question.7
2. Mathematical operations. The participants were asked to solve 3 sets of 10 operations
(sum,subtraction,multiplication,divisions). Eachsethadtobecompletedwithinone
minute. No minimum time was enforced and the participants could skip a set or not
ﬁll in the result of an operation. The sets were generated using Mail Goggles’s GMail
Labs app by Jon Perlow8 and were graded in terms of difﬁculty.
3. Consumer problems: The participants were asked to solve three simple problems that
were expressed in simple terms. The ﬁrst tested their understanding of the concept of
area, thesecondandthirdweredesignedtotestwhethertheyunderstoodhowanarea
relates to its dimensions, and the fourth checked whether they were able to translate
7Only one participant did so.
8http://gmailblog.blogspot.com/2008/10/new-in-labs-stop-sending-mail-you-later.html
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solvedwithinoneminute. Nominimumtimewasenforcedandtheparticipantscould
skip any problem.
Once done with the control tasks, the participants ﬁlled in a short questionnaire designed
to assess their demographic proﬁle. They were ﬁnally asked to guess what the experiment
was about - to check for demand effects - and to rate their level of motivation during the
experiment. Finally, each participant drew from a urn a number from 1 to 80, and was paid
according to her purchasing decision in the drawn period.
4 How can (or should) consumers make choices
Therearemanywaysinwhichonemaymodelconsumerchoiceamongoffersinourmenus,
but we will limit ourselves to combinations of two simple criteria for choice and then take
into account other factors in our empirical model. We consider two criteria for choosing be-
tween products: based on imperfect observation of unit prices (what we will call “signals”),
and based on whether the product belongs to a CS or not. Denote ˆ upi j Æ upi Åei j the per-
ceived unit price of offer i by consumer j. upi is the unit price of offer i, while ei j is an
error term, which is independent across offers in a menu and across consumers. How large
the error term will be on average will depend on the consumer’s accuracy and on how difﬁ-
cult it is to compare offers across standards. As for whether an offer belongs to a CS or not,
this matters because prices are directly comparable within a standard, so the consumer can
identify the LPCS with high accuracy.9 From those two criteria, we can derive four possible















Signals First Naive Rule
Signals
Threshold
Figure 6: Choice criteria and heuristics
9We will consider the possibility that a consumer may make mistakes in choosing among CS even if he is
aware of their existence, though one may alternatively argue that choosing a higher priced CS offer means the
consumer does not take account of CS information.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 044On the left, if the consumer ﬁrst considers whether offers belong to a CS, he will then
eliminate all higher priced CS offers (“HPCS”). From this point on, he may end his search by
choosing the LPCS (this is the CS rule), or he may compare the signal of the LPCS with that
of the individuated standard offers (“IS”) in the menu and choose the offer with the lowest
signal, which is what we call dominance editing (“DE”). On the right, if the consumer ﬁrst
considers signals, he may provisionally choose the ﬁrm with the lowest signal. If he does
not take account of the existence of a common standard, then he will opt for that offer, thus
following what we call the Naive rule (“Na” rule). If on the other hand the consumer takes
account of the existence of a CS and the offer he provisionally chose turns out to belong to
a CS, he will check whether his provisional choice is the LPCS, and if not, revise his choice
and opt for the LPCS. This is what we call the Signal-First rule (“SF” rule).
In other terms, the Naïve rule chooses argmin
i






if there is a CS, in which case it chooses argmin
iÝCS
( ˆ upkj, ˆ upi j), reverts to the Naïve rule other-
wise,theSFruledeterminesl Æargmin
i




As evoked above, many other rules may be followed, among those some we label as fol-
lows:
• Thebudgetrulechoosesarg minpi. Thisisarulethatfavorssmallpackages. Viswanathan
et al. (2005) says it may be followed by those consumers who face budget constraints
thatpreventthemfromspendingmorethanaﬁxedamount. Thisdoesnotmakesense
in our setting, except maybe for another reason, which is that it may be easier to eval-
uate how many times an area is contained into another if that area is small relative to
the other. Smaller areas would thus be chosen because they provide more certainty as
to how much will be spent overall when choosing them.
• The bulk purchasing rule, whereby some consumers may favor big packages, which is
justiﬁedifoneconsidersthatthecostofthematerialinapackagedecreasesinrelation
to the value of its content as its size increases, so offers in big packages are usually
better deals than those in small packages.
• The omniscient rule chooses argmin
i
upi, and corresponds to the Naive rule with no
error term. This may be followed if a consumer spends considerable time measuring
theareaofeachofferandthencomputestheratio p/s foreachoffersoastodetermine
the best offer. This may be the case of poor but numerate consumers (Viswanathan
et al., 2005).
• The random rule chooses offers at random, and corresponds to the Naive rule when
ei j is very large.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 044• Lexicographic rules may favor the ﬁrst offers in the lexicographic order in the menu
– maybe because the consumer is satisﬁcing rather than optimizing (Simon, 1955) or
simply because he does not have time to consider all offers. They may also favor the
last offers in the menu, if the consumer tends to remember (and choose) the last op-
tion they read from a list.
• Theshaperule mayfavorsomeshapesoverothers, asevidencedinKrideretal.(2001).
4.1 The Threshold rule
The DE and LPCS rule are in fact only extreme cases in a larger category of what we call
Threshold rules that function as follows: choose k Æ argmin
i2CS
pi if there is a CS and then
choosel(vj)Æarg min
iÝCS
( ˆ upk, ˆ upivj),withvj dependingonconsumer j’spreferencefor(vj È




depends on the consumer’s accuracy in assessing the unit price of offers in a menu, with
less accurate consumers beneﬁting from adopting higher thresholds vj. vj=1 corresponds
to the DE rule, vj !1 corresponds to the CS rule.
To put this in behavioral terms, the consumer who adopts a threshold vj È 1 does not
rejectISoffersoutofhand,butpenalizesthem,thatis,hedoesnotfollowhisﬁrstimpression
( ˆ upi j) of the value of the product, but rather revises it upwards when comparing it to his
perception of the value of common standard offers. In other terms, the consumer applies a
certaindoseofscepticismtohisevaluationofanofferthatisexpressedinuncommonterms,
and will choose to buy it only if it seems sufﬁciently better than the best of those offers that
are expressed in common terms – that is, its unit price appears to be lower by a factor of at
least 1¡1/vj compared to the apparent unit price of the LPCS.
To make this even clearer, suppose the consumer compares two oranges and one apple,
with oranges being priced at $0.45 and $0.55 respectively, while the price of the apple is
$0.65. The consumer cares only about calories, of which he needs 2000 per day for a work
paid $30 per day. His utility is expressed as 30¡p £2000 with p the price per calories of
his food. He estimates the oranges to contain 35 calories each, while the apple appears to
contain 55 calories. He compares the lower priced orange with the apple in terms of price
per calories. The lower priced orange appears to cost $1.29 per 100 calories, while the apple
appears to costs $1.18 per 100 calories. The consumer will however choose the apple only
if his threshold is less than 1.09. This makes sense if for example he is not sure about the
respective calorie content of oranges vs. apple but is sure that both oranges have the same
number of calories.
Note that following the CS rule is strictly optimal in the context of Gaudeul and Sugden
(2011) as IS offers are systematically higher priced than CS offers in a competitive setting
whereﬁrmscanchoosetheirstandard,sothatevenanISofferwithaverygoodsignalshould
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generated, so that it is always better for a consumer to follow the Threshold rule with vj È1.
We will see later on that no consumer followed the CS rule in our experiment, but a number
of them did follow the Threshold rule. The next section goes further into comparing the
performance of the various rules introduced above.
4.2 How do the different rules perform?
How the different rules perform depends on how accurate consumers are in their choices.
There are two extreme cases: If consumers make no mistakes, then Na works best and LPCS
isworst. Indeed,takinganexamplewiththreemenusforeaseofnotationB¡E(min(a,b,c))È
B ¡E(min(a,b)) with B the budget and a,b,c i.i.d. random variables. On the other hand, if
consumersmakeconsiderablemistakes,thenNaisworst(itresultsinchoosingessentiallyat
random) while LPCS is best. Indeed B ¡E(min(a,b))ÈB ¡E(a). We performed simulations
with Octave (Eaton, 2002) to examine the performance of each rule in terms of expected
consumer payoff.10 We modeled ei j as following a normal distribution with mean zero and
variance ¾2. In the same way as in our experiment, products unit prices upi followed a
normal distribution with mean 0.5 and variance 0.01 (case with strong competition), and
0.05 (case with weak competition) and B was set to 60. Consumer choice was simulated ac-
cording to the various rules expressed above (Na, DE, LPCS, SF), as well as according to the
Thresholdrule,withtheoptimalthresholdcalculatedforeverylevelof¾2 sincelessaccurate
consumers beneﬁt from adopting higher thresholds. Their average payoff for each rule was
calculated over 2 million menu draws so as to achieve good accuracy. Note however that the
ranking of payoffs by rules is quite robust and differences in payoffs by rule are signiﬁcant
for low number of choices.11
The following graphs show payoffs in the four situations in our experimental setting,
that is depending on whether the consumer has a choice among three or six options, and
whether prices are drawn from a distribution corresponding to either weak or strong com-
petition. Also shown on separate scale is the optimal threshold v¤ for each value of the error
term.
10Program available upon request.
11In all the following, “signiﬁcant” will be understood to mean “signiﬁcant at the 5% level at least”.
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Figure 7: Consumer payoffs by choice rules and optimal thresholds, by menu length and
strength of competition
As can be seen, payoff decreases as consumers become less accurate in their choice, ex-
cept for the LPCS rule since consumers always choose correctly among CS offers and thus
obtain B ¡E(min(a,b)). The Threshold rule outperforms all other rules, and converges to-
wards the CS rule for higher levels in ¾2. Following the CS rule obtains higher payoffs than
the DE, SF or Naive rules as long as ¾2 is not too low. The CS rule is better than those other
rules even for rather precise consumers when competition is strong, as even high levels of
accuracy may result in mistakes if prices are close together. In terms of ranking of rules,
the Threshold rule outperforms the CS rule, while both SF and DE dominate Na, which is
because they take account of the existence of a CS. The reason SF dominates DE is that DE
doesnotrecognizethattheLPCSisstatisticallyofhigherexpectedvaluethanISoffers, while
the SF does not have such a bias against CS offers, treating them in the same way as IS offers
in its ﬁrst step. However, DE saves time and effort compared to the SF because it requires
estimating the value of a lower number of alternatives than the SF.
5 Descriptive statistics and exploratory data analysis
We ran our experiment with 202 subjects at the Max Planck Institute in Jena on June 10, 14
and 15 in 2011, over 8 sessions with 24 to 27 subjects each. Subjects were asked for their
17
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 044age, gender, ﬁeld of study, year of study, motivation in completing the tasks, and also what
they thought the experiment was about (in order to control for demand effects). All subjects
were students, with 75 studying social sciences, of which 21 studying economics and 10
business administration. The rest were studying languages (21), natural sciences (16), or
were studying to become teachers (24), jurists (15) or health care professionals (13). When
asked what they thought the experiment was about after going through it, most subjects
guessed we wanted to assess their abilities to take account of both price and area to identify
the best offer in our menus. Some wondered if we wanted to identify what shapes were
perceived as more attractive, but no subject mentioned that some offers were expressed in
terms of a common standard.
Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Skewness Min Max N
Age 23.65 23.00 3.69 2.31 18.00 47.00 202
Gender 0.65 1.00 0.48 -0.64 0.00 1.00 202
Score in the shape
comparison task 0.25 0.25 0.10 0.35 0.05 0.58 201
Score in practical
problems 2.78 3.00 0.96 -0.27 1.00 4.00 202
Score in mathematical
problems 20.92 21.50 2.93 -1.45 6.00 25.00 202
Reported motivation 6.29 7.00 2.28 -0.67 0.00 10.00 202
Mean individual pay-
off 11.44 11.48 0.41 -0.80 9.88 12.28 202
Mean time spent on
each task 19.67 18.34 6.36 1.30 11.66 46.27 202
The average age of our subjects was 23.65, ranging from 18 to 47 (Table 2). 65% of our
subjects were women. The average motivation of our subjects, on a scale from 0 to 10, was
6.23, with a median motivation of 7 and 75% of our subjects having motivation more than
5, the middle point. The monotony of the tasks did not therefore result in noticeable dis-
content. Speed of choice for each menu and each subject was also recorded. Subjects took
20 seconds on average to make each choice (they could not make a choice before 10 sec-
onds had elapsed). The fastest subject took 12 seconds on average on each menu, meaning
he spent 16 minutes on this part of the experiment, while the slowest took 46 seconds per
menu on average, thus spending a bit more than one hour on the purchasing tasks.
As for the control tasks, in the test of the ability to assess the area of one shape in terms
18
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valueoftheratioofthesizeofoneshapetotheotherastheaverageofjguess¡true valuej/true value.
On average, people were 25% off the true value, with a minimum of 5% and a maximum of
57%. In the task to test mathematical ability, we coded answers as either right or wrong. On
average, subjects got 21 of the 25 calculations right, with only two obtaining less than half of
thecalculationsright,and7ofthemobtainingallofthemright. Subjectsperformedlesswell
with practical consumption problems with only about 62% answering more than half of the
questions correctly. Performance in the different tasks were signiﬁcantly and positively cor-
related, though not highly (correlation coefﬁcients were around 0.35). Women performed
less well than men in all tasks.
5.1 Individual payoffs
Let us now consider individual payoffs by menu length, strength of competition and pres-
ence of a CS (Table 3).
Table 3: Payoffs by menu length, strength of competition and CS
Strong competition Weak competition
Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev N
3-menu
No CS 10.41 0.92 1818 11.02 4.56 1818
One CS 10.45 0.96 1818 13.34¤ 3.96 1818
6-menu
No CS 10.14 0.81 1818 11.97 4.11 1818
One CS 10.04¤ 0.98 1818 13.84¤ 5.48 1818
Two CS 10.78¤(¤) 0.87 808 12.78¤(¤) 4.34 808
* Difference signiﬁcant vs. one row above.
(*) Difference signiﬁcant vs. two rows above.
Thistablecanbereadinconjunctionwithanothertablethatindicateshowthosepayoffs
translate in terms of how close they are to the maximum available payoff in each menu.
Table 4 thus reports the average of the ratio (upmax ¡upchosen)/(upmax ¡upmin) over
individuals and tasks in each category. We will call this the performance ratio. A value of
0 would indicate the consumers always made the worst choice, while a value of 1 would
indicate they always made the best choice.
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Strong competition Weak competition
Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev N
3-menu
No CS 0.597 0.447 1818 0.607 0.448 1818
One CS 0.592 0.419 1818 0.794¤ 0.324 1818
6-menu
No CS 0.683 0.353 1818 0.682 0.321 1818
One CS 0.545¤ 0.364 1818 0.735¤ 0.299 1818
Two CS 0.735¤(¤) 0.323 808 0.759(¤) 0.365 808
* Difference signiﬁcant vs. one row above.
(*) Difference signiﬁcant vs. two rows above.
Subjectsobtainedapayoffof11.44ECUonaverage(1ECU=0.8"),andtheirperformance
ratio was0.66. Noparticipantobtainedpayoffsthatweresigniﬁcantly lessthan10.22, which
is what they would have obtained had they chosen at random within our menus, and only
8 obtained payoffs that were not signiﬁcantly greater than this. Subjects therefore seem to
have been careful in their choices. As could be expected from statistical arguments, individ-
uals obtained higher payoffs with 6-menus and when competition was less intense.
WhenchoosingfrommenuswithnoCS,participantsobtained10.89ECU(std. dev. 3.21)
andtheirperformanceratiowas0.64(std. dev. 0.40), whilewhenchoosingfrommenuswith
one CS they obtained 11.91 ECU (std. dev. 3.84) while their performance ratio was 0.67 (std.
dev. 0.37). Participants thus generally obtained signiﬁcantly higher payoffs and performed
signiﬁcantly better when a menu included a CS, except in the case of 6-menus with one
CS and strong competition. The presence of a CS did not consistently improve consumer
payoffs when competition was strong, but signiﬁcantly and consistently increased payoffs
when competition was weak.
Regressions of payoffs on individual and menu characteristics indicate that women ob-
tained better payoffs,12 payoff increased with the order in which the task was presented (so
there was some learning) and subjects with higher scores in the mathematical and practical
tasks obtained higher payoffs as well. Motivation, scores in the shape comparison task and
time spent on a task did not appear to have a signiﬁcant effect.13 There was no individual
effect, that is, no individual seemed to perform better than others above and beyond what
could be predicted from their gender and task scores. Lower strength of competition, longer
length of the menu and the presence of a CS also increased payoffs. The effects above are
robust to various speciﬁcations.
Overall, consumers made about 39% of their choices correctly, that is, choosing the ﬁrm
12We will see later that this might be due to their better use of CS information.
13We checked also if there was some quadratic effect in terms of time spent, with time spent increasing
payoffsbutfastesttimes(inattention)andslowesttimes(difﬁculty)obtaininglowerpayoffs. Whilecoefﬁcients
were of the correct sign, they were not signiﬁcant.
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the correct choice. In other terms, most consumers were wrong for most menus. Looking
at menus where consumers performed particularly badly, one ﬁnds that they mistakenly
chose smaller size options, triangles, options to the end of the lexicographic order, or the
LPCS when the IS was actually better. This underlines an important point about the CS
rule: while following it maximizes average payoffs for a consumer that is prone to making
mistakes, it does not lead to the correct choice for each individual choice instance.
When mapping payoffs by menu length and strength of competition (rows with no CS in
table 3) to the predictions from our simulations for those menus with no common standard
(Graph 7), we ﬁnd that they correspond to a situation in which the standard error of the
consumers’ error term is 0.15, though consumers seem more accurate when competition is
strong. Lower accuracy when choosing within menus where competition is weak did not
prevent them from obtaining higher payoffs than when choosing within menus where com-
petition is strong however. A tentative explanation may be that consumers could perceive
that prices in some menus were closer together than in others, and thus paid more atten-
tion in those cases. Consumers did not obtain higher payoffs in 6-menus than in 3-menus
when competition was strong, that is, they appear to have been less accurate when faced
with more choice. Note that the optimal threshold vj if the standard error of the consumer’s
error term is 0.15 would be between 1.2 and 1.4. We will see that consumers generally chose
thresholds that were lower than this, indicating perhaps that they were over-conﬁdent in
their ability to make accurate choices.
5.2 Firms sales and proﬁts
Table 5 shows that the LPCS was chosen about 56% of the time within our 3-menus, a lot
more often than the IS. Similarly, the LPCS was chosen about 25% of the time in 6-menus
withonlyoneCS,whileeachofthefourISofferswerechosenonlyabout18%ofthetime. We
do not report results for 6-menus with two CS from this point on.14 From this, we can con-
clude that consumer are not all following the DE rule, as this would have resulted in choice
probabilities being divided equally across all offers except the HPCS. They are not all follow-
ing the CS rule either, since the LPCS would then have been chosen with probability one.
Their choices would be more consistent with the SF rule overall since consumers appear to
diverttheirchoicesfromtheHPCStotheLPCSwithoutgreatlyaffectingtheprobabilitywith
which a IS is chosen. We will see later, however, that this is an artefact of the aggregation of
individual choices, as individuals follow a mix of rules and few actually follow the SF rule.
14This is both for ease of exposition and because results with two CS would require that we extend further
our tables to include the LPCS and HPCS of the larger standard and of the smaller standard.
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Strong competition Weak competition
LPCS HPCS IS ﬁrm LPCS HPCS IS ﬁrm
3-menu
No CS NA NA 33.33% NA NA 33.33%
One CS 53.63% 7.21% 39.11% 59.79% 4.51% 35.70%
6-menu
No CS NA NA 16.67% NA NA 16.67%
One CS 25.63% 4.07% 17.58% 25.47% 2.97% 17.89%
Note: There was one instance in which a subject did not make a choice in time, so the sales do not add up to
100% in the case of the strong competition 3-menu with a CS. In 6-menus, sales for an individual IS ﬁrm are
calculated by averaging sales by IS ﬁrms.
Consider an hypothetical ﬁrm that would have been the one making the LPCS offers
within our menus, and let us call it a “LPCS ﬁrm”. Its proﬁt equals revenues since we do
not consider production costs. That LPCS ﬁrm would have sold at a lower price than either
IS or HPCS ﬁrms on average, but its proﬁts would still be higher than either IS or HPCS
proﬁts since the LPCS was chosen more often (Table 6). More precisely, proﬁt of an LPCS
ﬁrm would be 0.27 on average when there are three options, compared with proﬁt of 0.17
for an IS ﬁrm ﬁrm, and 0.12 on average when there are six options and one CS, compared
with proﬁt of 0.09 for an IS ﬁrm.15 Note however that an IS ﬁrm would still make higher
proﬁt when there is a CS than when not as the number of competing ﬁrms decreases with
the ensuing quasi-elimination of the HPCS ﬁrm.
Strong competition Weak competition
LPCS HPCS IS ﬁrm LPCS HPCS IS ﬁrm
3-menu
No CS NA NA 0.1653 NA NA 0.1632
One CS 0.2640 0.0362 0.1949 0.2811 0.0233 0.1622
6-menu
No CS NA NA 0.0831 NA NA 0.0800
One CS 0.1271 0.0205 0.0880 0.1110 0.0147 0.0840
Table 6: Proﬁt by menu length, strength of competition and CS
Note: In 6-menus, proﬁts for an individual IS ﬁrm are calculated by averaging proﬁts by IS ﬁrms.
In summary, an LPCS ﬁrm would make higher proﬁts than other ﬁrms, consumers ob-
tain higher payoffs when there is a CS, and the price at which LPCS offers are sold is lower
than the price at which other offers (HPCS, IS) are sold. There would therefore be an incen-
tive for an IS ﬁrm to switch to a CS, and also an incentive for consumers to choose the LPCS
offers. While this may not necessarily translate into a convergence to a CS as hypothesized
in Gaudeul and Sugden (2011) (this will be tested in a further article), the conditions are in
place for this to be so.
15One can retrieve average sales price by the formula proﬁt=sales£price, using data in tables 5 and 6.
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We ﬁrst determine in this part how consumers make choices among options in menus with
no CS, then consider their choices among menus with one CS, and ﬁnally determine rules
followed by consumers at the individual level. This will allow us to determine whether in-
deed consumers prefer offers that are presented in terms of a CS. The menus with no CS are
used to simulate the outcome of various choice rules the consumers may follow when faced
with menus that include one CS (we do not present the analysis for menus with two CS).
Those predictions are then compared with the observed choices to determine what choice
rule best predicts consumer choice, at the individual and at the global level. We therefore
begin with the expression of the model to predict consumer choice among menus with no
CS.
6.1 Consumer choice when there is no common standard
We perform maximum likelihood estimation with three different models, the alternative-
speciﬁc conditional logit and probit models and the mixed logit model which allows for
preference heterogeneity for all the attributes. The probit model is ﬁtted by using maxi-
mum simulated likelihood implemented by the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) algo-
rithm (Greene and Hensher, 2003). The Halton sequence is used to generate the point sets
used in the quasi-Monte Carlo integration of the multivariate normal density, while opti-
mization is performed using the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman procedure(Berndt et al., 1974).
Themixedlogitmodelisﬁttedbyusingmaximumsimulatedlikelihood(Train,2003)andthe
estimation was performed with the user-writtenmixlogit command for Stata (Hole, 2007).
Estimation makes use of the sandwich estimator of variance, except when performing the
probit regressions with 6-menus where convergence was not achieved otherwise.
The outcome for each menu is one of 3 or 6 options. Options are identiﬁed by their posi-
tioninthemenuifthereisnoCS,andbywhethertheyaretheLPCS,HPCSoranISinmenus
withaCS.Thedependentvariableisthechoiceoftheconsumeramongalternativesandthe
independent variables include the price of the option, its shape and its size. Shape is coded
from most attractive to least attractive, which means that a triangle is assigned a value of 1,
a square a value of 2 and a circle a value of 3 as shapes that extend more broadly in space
are preferred (see Krider et al., 2001). If an alternative speciﬁc constant was included in the
model and was signiﬁcant for some options, this would mean that position in the menu in-
ﬂuenceschoice. AsperaremarkinHole(2007),weincludenoalternative-speciﬁcconstants
in our models, which is “common practice when the data come from so-called unlabeled
choice experiments, where the alternatives have no utility beyond the characteristics at-
tributed to them in the experiment.” We however consider a variable “position” which takes
values from 1 if the option is in the top left corner to 6 if it is in the bottom right corner in a
6-menu, otherwise to 3 for the option to the right in a 3-menu. This allows us to determine
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Formally, denote yo
i jm the utility of option j in menu m for invidual i, and denote yi jm Æ
1 if that option is chosen. We will have yi jm Æ1 if yo
i jm È yo
itm for all t 6Æ j in menu m, 0 else.
Latentutility yo
i jm takestheform yo
i jm Æ®upjmÅ¯shapejmÅ°areajmÅÁpositionjmÅui jm
withui jm arandomvariable ofmean0 thatfollows either alogisticora normal distribution.
We ﬁnd that a full model that takes into account all the above variables minimizes the
Akaike Information Criterion (“AIC”). Results are shown in table 7 and indicate that a multi-
nomial probit model is preferred to a logit model, so error terms are best seen as following
a normal distribution as was done in our simulations. Subjects tend to prefer options that
have a lower unit price, “broader” shapes, and smaller sized options (equivalently, those
with lower displayed prices). There is no consistent tendency for consumers to favor either
options at the beginning or at the end of the menu. Results from the mixed logit model in-
dicate there is signiﬁcant variation in the extent to which irrelevant factors (shape and size)
inﬂuenced consumers.
6.2 Consumer choice when there is a common standard
The analysis of the case where there is a CS differs from the case where there is no CS in that
options in a menu differ in nature depending on whether they are the LPCS, the HPCS or an
IS. Whether a subject avoids the HPCS or prefers the LPCS vs. the ISs may depend on their
individual characteristics so that we introduce case-speciﬁc variable (here, a case is an in-
dividual) along with alternative-speciﬁc variables to determine choice among alternatives.
Ourcasespeciﬁcvariablesareindividualscoresinthemathematical,shapecomparisonand
practical problems, along with gender, time spent on a task and motivation.
The model above is thus modiﬁed as follows: Latent utility yo
i jm takes the form yo
i jm Æ
­i¸j Å®upjm Å¯shapejm Å°areajm ÅÁpositionjm Åui jm. As before, j is the option, m
is the menu and i is the invidual. An option is coded in terms of whether it is the LPCS,
the HPCS or an IS offer, in which case it is coded as IS1 to IS4 depending on its position in
the menu. ­i is a 1£q vector of case-speciﬁc variables, the same variables being assumed
to inﬂuence the choice for each option, and ¸j is a q £1 vector of parameters, different for
each alternative as case-speciﬁc variables are assumed not to inﬂuence the choice of each
alternativeinthesameway. ui jm isarandomvariableofmean0thatfollowseitheralogistic
oranormaldistribution. Weconstrain¸j tobethesameforallISoptionsin6-menus. Model
selection using the AIC ﬁnds that all of the alternative speciﬁc variables ought to be used,
while only score in the shape comparison and in the mathematical tasks, along with gender,
ought to be used as case-speciﬁc variables. Results are reported in table 6.2.
In terms of alternative-speciﬁc variables, our results when there was no CS are con-
ﬁrmed, that is, subjects tend to prefer lower priced options, “broader” shapes, and smaller
sizedoptions(equivalently, thosewithlowerdisplayedprices). Consumerstendtofavorop-
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 044tions at the end of the 6-menus, maybe because of difﬁculties in recalling options that are
previousintermsoftheirlexicographicorder. Intermsofcase-speciﬁcvariables,consumers
tend to avoid the HPCS: the parameter on the constant term for that option is negative and
highlysigniﬁcant. However,itisonlyinthecaseof3-menusthatconsumersdisplayanaver-
sion to the IS vs. the LPCS, while this is not the case in 6-menus. Individual that are worst at
the shape comparison tasks are more likely to choose the HPCS, maybe because they ﬁnd it
difﬁcult to compare the area and shape of all options and thus do not notice the presence of
a CS. Interestingly, those subjects that are better at the mathematical task tend also not to
avoid the HPCS as much as others, though the effect is small and appears only for 6 menus.
Women seem to be better than men at avoiding the HPCS, and also seem to avoid the IS,
thus being closer to following the LPCS rule. In conclusion, all consumers tend to avoid the
IS in 3-menus, though this is more pronounced for women, while only women appear to
keep on following the LPCS rule when choosing among 6-menus. This might explain why
women managed to obtain higher payoffs than men in this experiment even though they
were less good at tasks that predict higher payoffs in our regressions.
A reason why some subjects would not display aversion to the IS in 6-menus while they
do so in 3-menus may be found in the difﬁculty in identifying the presence of a CS in those
menus. An indication of this, with reference to table 5, is that sales of the HPCS were higher
in six menus than in 3 menus, which means more subjects did not realize there was a CS.16
Following the CS rule in 6-menus might thus require that one have a more distinct under-
standing of it than in 3-menus since one has to be actively checking if there is a CS in 6-
menus while the presence of a CS is almost self-evident in 3-menus.
6.3 Assigment of consumers to rules
We seek in this part to compare consumers’ decisions with what would be predicted under
different selection rules, as presented in section 4. Consider table 9 which shows the unit
price and standard of three options in a menu, the choice of a consumer among those three
options,andthepredictedchoiceunderdifferentchoicerules. Predictedchoiceisexpressed
in terms of probabilities. The consumer is said to follow the choice rule he is closest to in
terms of log likelihood, weighted by the number of degrees of freedom allowed by each rule.
16Note that to translate sales from the 3-menus to the 6-menus, one has to divide them by two.
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HPCS LPCS IS
Unit price 0.51 0.50 0.48
Standard A A B













Threshold rule 0 pNa
LPCS(LPCS,IS£v) 1¡pTh
LPCS
In the case shown in table 9, the consumer chooses the LPCS, and may thus be following
any of the possible rules. If he had chosen the HPCS, then one would have been able to say
he must be Naive. If he had chosen the IS, then one could have said he was not following the
CS rule. If the same type of choice is offered several times and the consumer never chooses
the HPCS, then he is unlikely to be Naive. If he always choose the LPCS, then he is likely to
follow the LPCS rule. If he chooses either the LPCS or the IS, but more often the LPCS, then
he is likely to follow either the SF rule or a Threshold rule.
WeusetheestimationresultsfromtheregressionsdoneforthecasewherethereisnoCS
to predict choice when there is a CS. If the consumer is Naive, his choice will be predicted by
applying parameter estimates from the model with no CS to the data with CS. If he follows
the CS rule, he will choose the LPCS. If he follows the SF rule, then the probability to choose
the LPCS is the sum of the probability to choose the HPCS or the LPCS obtained when ap-
plying parameter estimates from the model with no CS. If he follows the DE rule, then one
can exclude the HPCS from the consideration set, for example by applying the parameter
estimates from the model with no CS to the data with a CS modiﬁed such that the price of
the HPCS is unaffordable.
In terms of notations, we denote the probability the LPCS is chosen under the DE rule
as pDE
LPCS Æ pNa
LPCS(LPCS,IS). This is to be interpreted as the probability a Naive consumer
would choose the LPCS if his choice was restricted to either the LPCS or the IS. Similarly, the
probability the LPCS is chosen under the Threshold rule is pTh
LPCS Æ pNa
LPCS(LPCS,IS¢v).
This is to be interpreted as the probability a Naive consumer would choose the LPCS if
his choice was restricted to either the LPCS or the IS and the price of the IS was multiplied
by a factor v.
The CS, DE and SF rules predict that the HPCS will never be chosen. However, as we
saw, this is not the case in our data. One therefore has to take account that some consumers
choose the HPCS. We therefore do a separate regression so as to determine the probability
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 044pLPCS with which the LPCS is chosen among CS offers. Note that in this case, only the offer’s
position and its price may determine the choice, along with some case-speciﬁc variables,
since both shape and area are the same in a CS. One thus modiﬁes the formulas above as








IS is as before. In the case of the CS rule: pCS
LPCS Æ pLPCS
and pCS








HPCS. The principle is the same for
obtaining pTh. Formulas are slightly longer in the case of 6-menus but can be inferred from
the above.
We still face a problem in that the CS rule predicts the IS will never be chosen, which
means that any consumer who ever chose an IS even if he always chose the CS otherwise
wouldbepredictednottofollowtheCSbythemaximumlikelihoodcriterion(thisonewould
tend to inﬁnity). We can conﬁrm that no consumer systematically chose the LPCS within
every menus with a CS. Therefore, strictly speaking, no consumer followed the CS rule. This
is where the Threshold rule, which spans the gap between the CS and the DE rule, comes in
play. Wethuscomputeforeachconsumer, theparameter vj thatmaximizestheirmaximum
likelihood. Subjects with a high value of vj are close to following the CS rule, while those
with low vj are close to following the DE rule.
Compared to the Na predictions, both the SF and the DE predictions make use of an
additional degree of freedom as they require CS information. Compared to the SF and the
DE,theThresholdrulemakesuseofyetonemoredegreeoffreedomasitrequiresestimating
the threshold used by the subjects.
Comparison between rules will thus be done using the Akaike Information Criterion
(“AIC”), but also, for the purpose of comparison, and even though we know this is not a cor-
rect way to estimate the performance of a model, by counting the number of choices that
were “correctly” predicted by each rule, with “correct prediction” being taken to mean that
the option that had the highest probability to be chosen according to one rule was indeed
chosen.







t j with t denoting
the menu, N the total number of menus presented to consumers, j denoting the option,
M the number of options, and yt j Æ 1 iff yt Æ j, 0 otherwise, whereby yt is the consumer’s
choice. pt j Æ Pr(yt Æ j) is the predicted probability, which depends on the rule we assume
for consumers’ choice, so for example pt j Æ1 iff j is the LPCS and the consumer is assumed
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Table 10 reports the log-likelihood, the values of the AIC and of the Bayesian information
criterion (“BIC”) and the sum of correctly predicted choices (“CPC”) for each rule, for 3 and
6-menus. The last column contains the value of v that maximizes the log-likelihood for the
Threshold rule. The number v reported there is to be interpreted as “consumers appear to
consider IS options as v times more expensive when they are presented next to CS options
than when they are presented next to other IS options”. This measures the price penalty
applied to IS options when compared to the LPCSs. For more interpretation of this number,
see the detailed explanation in section 4.1.
Table 10: Rules scores, aggregate behavior
Naive Signal Dominance Threshold v
First Editing Heuristic
3-menus LL ¡3520 ¡2993 ¡3078 ¡2978 1.07
df 6 7 7 8
AIC 7052 6000 6170 5972
BIC 7089 6043 6213 6022
CPC 2104 2148 2143 2209 1.09
N 3636 3636 3636 3636
6-menus LL ¡5953 ¡5727 ¡5734 ¡5703 1.05
df 6 7 7 8
AIC 11918 11468 11482 11422
BIC 11955 11511 11525 11472
CPC 1137 1190 1277 1333 1.12
N 3636 3636 3636 3636
The choices in 6-menus appear to be considerably less accurately predicted under any
type of rule than in the 3-menus. This means there is more randomness in consumer choice
in 6-menus, probably because it is more difﬁcult to compare 6 offers than 3 offers as this re-
quires holding more information into one’s working memory. The threshold heuristic gives
the best predictions for both menu lengths, while the Signal-First heuristics comes second
according to the AIC. The Naive rule is clearly rejected in all cases so consumers do take CS
information into account. In terms of threshold, an IS offer suffers a 5 to 7% price penalty
compared to the LPCS offer, which is a considerable amount. The consumers do not in the
aggregate appear to merely follow the dominance editing heuristic, that is, they do tend to
disfavor IS offers in favor of the LPCS.
While those aggregate results are interesting in their own right, we are more interested
in individual behavior and attempt to determine rules followed by individuals in the next
section.
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Theabovetechniqueswereusedtodeterminerulesfollowedbythesubjects. Table11cross-
tabulates the number of subjects assigned to each type when looking at 3-menus and at
6-menus, summarizes our ﬁndings:
Table 11: Subjects assigned to rules, by menu length.
6 menus
Naive SF DE Th Total
3-menus
Naive 26 7 6 1 40
SF 25 23 21 3 72
DE 17 15 22 2 56
Th 9 11 10 3 33
Total 77 56 59 9 201
Pearson’s chi-square test of independence rejects the hypothesis that types are indepen-
dent between 6- and 3-menus. Subjects thus tend to follow the same rules in both menu-
lengths, that is, the numbers in the diagonal of the table tend to be the highest of their re-
spectiverowsandcolumns. Whennotkeepingtothesamerules, thosewhofollowedtheDE
ortheSFrulein3-menustendtobecomeNaivewhenchoosingamong6-menus. Thehigher
number of subjects being Naive when faced with 6-menus (77 vs. 40 in 3-menus) tends to
conﬁrm that subjects do not notice the presence of a CS in 6-menus. Worse, the lower num-
ber of subjects following the SF rule in 6-menus vs. 3-menus (56 vs. 72 in 3-menus) means
that subjects may not even realize, after making a provisional choice that is a CS, that it is a
CS.
Intermsofpayoffs, andwhetherconsidering3-menusor6-menus, consumersfollowing
the Naive rule tend to obtain signiﬁcantly lower payoffs than consumers of all other types,
as could be expected from our analysis of rule performance in section 4.2. Consumers that
follow the DE and the SF rules obtain comparable payoffs and obtain signiﬁcantly higher
payoffsthanNaiveconsumers. ThosewhofollowtheThresholdrulealsoobtainsigniﬁcantly
higher payoffs than Naive consumers but do not obtain signiﬁcantly higher payoffs than
either the DE or the SF.
However, this is because some consumers, rather than favoring CS, actually disfavor
them, and are thus assigned to the Threshold rule as well. When considering only the 29
subjects of the 33 assigned to the Threshold rule that do favor CS in 3-menus, and the 6 sub-
jects of the 9 assigned to the Threshold rule that do favor CS in 6-menus, their payoffs are
not signiﬁcantly higher than the payoffs of DE and SF subjects when considering 3-menus,
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Overall therefore, consumers that do not realize there is a CS do tend to obtain lower
payoffs than others, those who follow the SF, DE and Threshold rule obtain comparable
payoffs in 3-menus, while those following the Threshold rule perform signiﬁcantly better
in 6-menus. While theory would have predicted that consumers following the SF rule would
obtain higher payoffs than those who follow the DE rule, the difference between their pay-
offs was not predicted to be large, explaining perhaps the lack of signiﬁcance of the differ-
ence.
Whiletherearenosigniﬁcantdifferencesintherulesfollowedbydifferentgenderswhen
faced with 3-menus, women are signiﬁcantly more likely to follow the SF and signiﬁcantly
less likely to follow the DE rule when faced with 6-menus. As seen in this paper, the SF rule
theoretically obtains higher payoffs than the DE rule, however, as seen above, this is not the
case in our sample.
6.3.3 Do consumers that follow the Threshold rule choose their threshold rationally?
In terms of thresholds used by those individuals that were assigned to the Threshold rule,
theory presented in this paper would predict that a rational consumer who is beset by an
inability to assess offers accurately ought to be using higher thresholds than those used by
subjects that are more accurate. Accuracy can be estimated by the payoffs consumers ob-
tained when faced with menus with no CS. Those who obtained higher average payoffs in
those cases are more accurate. The following graphs relate average payoffs obtained by sub-
jects in 3 and 6 menus with no CS to the threshold assigned to them by the procedure above.
Bigger points indicate those individuals that were assigned to the Threshold rule. We super-
imposeonthisgraphtheoptimalchoiceofthresholdforaconsumeroftheaccuracyimplied
by his average payoff when faced with menus with no CS. We computed the optimal thresh-
old to be used when the consumer knows the distribution of price variances across menus
but does not know, when presented with a menu, whether the menu has high or low price
variance,asthisseemsmorereasonabletous. Thatis,withreferencetopart4.1,expectation
in the formula determining v¤
j is taken over all menus of a speciﬁc length.
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Figure 8: Optimal vs. realized threshold in 3 and 6-menus
We ﬁnd no relation between payoffs when faced with menus with no CS and the thresh-
old used by the consumer, and this whether the consumer was predicted to be following the
Threshold rule or not. This means that while consumers that use the Threshold rule can
be considered as being more savvy than those who follow other rules, they are however not
fullyrational: theyeitherarenotawareoftheirownlevelofaccuracy,ordonotmakethelink
between their accuracy and the threshold they ought to be using. Alternatively, consumers
may have too much conﬁdence in their own ability to choose the best offers so they tend to
use thresholds that are too low. In that respect, we note that following the DE rule can be
seen as consistent if the consumer is fully conﬁdent in his ability to assess prices accurately.
6.3.4 Do consumers learn to follow the Threshold rule?
Inthissection,wewanttoseeifconsumerslearntofollowtheThresholdruleoverthecourse
of the experiment. We therefore exclude the ﬁrst 20 menus each consumer was faced with
– since menus were presented to each consumer in a random order, this will not be the
same set of menus for each subject – and run the same regressions as in the above parts.
Assignments to types are reported below:
Table 12: Subjects assigned to rules, by menu length, minus ﬁrst 20 menus
6 menus
Naive SF DE Th Total
3-menus
Naive 17 8 15 3 43
SF 26 19 16 9 70
DE 13 15 22 2 52
Th 8 12 11 5 36
Total 64 54 64 19 201
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dependentbetween6-and3-menusinthiscase. However,classiﬁcationisconsistentwithin
menu lengths, that is, 69% of individuals are classiﬁed the same way in 3-menus, and 74%
in 6-menus, whether one considers all menus or one excludes the ﬁrst 20 menus. This indi-
cates that while our classiﬁcation by type is robust within menus of the same length, this is
not so across menu-length, indicating perhaps that individuals do not follow the same rules
in both cases. In terms of learning, more individuals use the Threshold rule in later stages
of the experiment, but the increase is small. Learning in such an environment, where no
menu was ever the same, would in any case be rather difﬁcult, since it is difﬁcult for sub-
jects to ascribe a high payoff (subjects were told their payoff after each try) to the strategy
they followed or to the menu having offered a good opportunity. It seems however that sub-
jects learn to realize that there may be common standards in 6-menus, where CS are less
obvious. Indeed, fewer subjects appear to be naive when excluding the ﬁrst 20 tries than
when considering the whole sample.
7 Conclusion
We found that as many as 16% of consumers followed the Threshold rule when choosing
among 3-menus, but that even with with some learning, less than 10% followed that rule
when choosing among 6-menus. Those consumers who followed the Threshold rule ap-
plied a large price penalty to offers that were expressed in terms of an individuated standard
however: An offer expressed in terms of an individuated standard had to be about 6% less
expensive than an offer expressed in terms of a common standard before it would have the
samelikelihoodtobechosen. Inotherterms, anofferexpressedintermsofacommonstan-
dardandpricedat$1.07isaslikelytobechosenbyoneofoursavvyconsumersthanthesame
offer expressed in terms of an individuated standard and priced at $1.00. Not only is this the
case, but this is a perfectly rational behavior when the consumer is not able to determine
the value of a product with sufﬁcient certainty. While this is a positive result, it is tempered
bythefactthatconsumersdidnotseemtolearntofollowtheThresholdruleoverthecourse
of the experiment, and even those who adopted the Threshold rule adopted thresholds that
were lower than would have been optimal given their inability to make accurate choices
among offers.
Even though relatively few consumers followed the Threshold rule, and even when they
did so adopted lower thresholds than optimal, consumers’ aggregate behavior favored of-
fers that were expressed in terms of a common standard. That this would be so even though
many consumers followed other rules underlines the robustness of the Threshold rule and
its ability to drive ﬁrms to adopt common standards. This disproportionate inﬂuence of
savvy consumers is due to the Signal-First and Naive rule being neutral with respect to the
existence of a common standard. Furthermore, while the dominance editing rule does not
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common standard offer gaining market shares at the expense of the higher priced com-
mon standard offers, making the adoption of a common standard a proﬁtable strategy. This
conﬁrms our belief that a process of convergence towards a common standard equilibrium
should occur under a broad set of initial conditions (Gaudeul and Sugden, 2007).
We also saw that “too much choice” could work towards negating the common stan-
dard effect, in the sense that it made it difﬁcult for consumers to identify offers that were
expressed in terms of a common standard. While the Threshold rule may be effective in
ﬁghting against the introduction of spurious complexity by ﬁrms wishing to confuse con-
sumers, it may therefore not be so effective in counteracting the introduction of spurious
variety, whereby ﬁrmswould pursue whatwecouldcallframeproliferationwhenfacedwith
the threat of the emergence of a common standard. This means that, for a common stan-
dard effect to be effective in markets where there is a multiplicity of choices, ﬁrms ought
to be able to advertise their use of a common standard. This is where complications occur,
since the claim to be following a “common standard” may be difﬁcult to verify and there are
myriads of ways in which a standard can be debased. For example, if the common standard
is in terms of the dimension of the product’s packaging, then ﬁrms might decide not to ﬁll
it properly (Adams et al., 1997, p.93, point 7). If it is in terms of weight, and in the case of
food, then managers may lower the quality of the product and mask this by increasing its
salt content. This means that if we accept that the effectiveness of the common standard
effect is enhanced by ﬁrms being able to advertise their use of a common standard, then
there may be a role for a regulatory authority that would promote and monitor the use of
standards and mandate the disclosure of the information that enters into the deﬁnition of
that standard.
In future work, we would like to test under what conditions ﬁrms in a competitive mar-
ket may converge towards the use of a common standard. From the present paper, con-
sumers that follow the Threshold rule have positive externalities on other consumers since
they make it unproﬁtable not to adhere to a common standard. Whether this translates to
a more complex competitive setting, and if so, subject to what restrictions, is an open ques-
tion, but this paper will help us in simulating the market conditions on the consumer side.
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By order of appearance:
CS: Common standard
IS: Individuated standard
LPCS: Lower priced CS offers
HPCS: Higher priced CS offers
3-menu: A menu composed of three offers
6-menu: A menu composed of six offers
B: Budget given to the consumer to buy paint
up: Unit price
s: Size of the area that can be covered by an offer
p: Price of an offer




v: Value of the threshold.
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Welcome to this experiment!
1. General rules/proceedings
During the experiment you are not allowed to talk to other participants. Please switch off
your mobile phone. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and refer directly to
the experimenters. One of the experimenters will then answer your question in private.
Please read these instructions carefully, as your payment will depend on the decisions
that you make during this experiment.
Onyourdeskyouwillﬁndthisinstructionsheet,apen,paper,andareceipt. Youcantake
notes at any time; the receipt will only be used for your personal payment at the end of this
experiment. During the experiment, we will not speak of Euro but use ECU (Experimental
Currency Units) as a currency instead.
The amount of ECU you earn during the experiment will be converted into Euro at the
end of the experiment using the following conversion rate: 0.8 " = 1 ECU. For example, if
your earnings amount to 12 ECU, you will receive 9.60 ". The ﬁnal payment will be rounded
up to the nearest 10 cents.
All participants will remain anonymous, i.e. after the experiment, no one –neither other
participantsnortheexperimenters–willbeabletoassociateyourpersonalinformationwith
your decisions or your earnings.
2. The Experiment
This experiment consists of several tasks. At the beginning of each task, you are endowed
with 60 ECU to buy grey paint from a shop in order to paint a speciﬁc, given area. Each
shop gives a choice between various offers. Each of them is structured in the same way, i.e.
it consists of a given shape and its corresponding price. In each offer, the grey shape on
display represents the fraction of the total area (which needs to be painted) that you can
paint with this speciﬁc offer.
Figure1presentsthethreedifferentoffersyouaregivenbyashop. Figure2showsthesix
different offers made by another shop. The total area which you have to paint is represented
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calculate how much paint you need to cover the entire area (the white square) and will also
buy the colour for you. The amount of your initial endowment that you do not spend for
buying the paint is yours to keep.
Figure 2
3. Examples
The following examples should help you understand how the computations made by the
computer work in detail. Suppose you are confronted with the offers in Figure 3 and the
total area you are supposed to paint is 100m².
Figure 3
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However, this circle only covers an area of 13m². As you need to paint a square which is
100m² in size, the computer calculates how much paint you actually need for this offer.
In this case, this amounts to 100/13 = 7.7 paint buckets.
Hence, the total price you have to pay for painting the white square amounts to:
6.39 x 7.7 = 49.2 ECU
Keeping in mind your initial endowment of 60 ECU, your earnings result as follows:
60 – 49.2 = 10.8 ECU.
In order to paint the area covered by the grey square, you pay 17.57 ECU.
However, this square only covers an area of 34m². As you need to paint a square which
is 100m² in size, the computer calculates how much paint you actually need for this offer.
In this case, this amounts to 100/34 = 2.94 paint buckets.
Hence, the total price you have to pay for painting the white square amounts to:
17.57 x 2.94 = 51.7 ECU
Keeping in mind your initial endowment of 60 ECU, your earnings result as follows:
60 – 51.7 =8.3 ECU
A separate pop-up dialog will automatically appear and will tell you the results of each
task (see Figure 4) including your possible earning of this task; clicking ‚OK‘ will start the
next task.
43
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 044Figure 4
You have at most two minutes for each task and can only submit a choice at least ten
seconds after you started it. In case you made a choice after two minutes (i.e. clicked on
one of the offers), but failed to submit the offer in time (by clicking ‘OK’), the computer will
nevertheless treat your selected offer as if you had submitted it. In case you did not make
any choice after two minutes, you will be paid 3 ECU for this task (if this task is chosen as
relevant for you payment).
You will be faced with 36 different tasks with 3 offers, and 44 with 6 offers. At the end
of the experiment, only one of the 80 tasks will be randomly selected and you will be paid
according to your earnings in this speciﬁc task.
4. Questionnaire and Quiz
Once you completed the 80 tasks, you will be asked to answer a few questions:
1. Pleaseﬁll inasimplequestionnaire. Theanswersyousubmitwillbetreatedconﬁden-
tially and no data will be disclosed.
2. Please compare different shapes with each other. You have one minute for each of the
four comparisons.
3. Please perform some computations. There will be 3 sets of computations and you will
have one minute for each.
4. Please solve a number of problems. There will be 4 problems, and you have 2 minutes
for each.
After you completed all the tasks, please raise your hand to signal the experimenters that
you ﬁnished the experiment and we can start with your payment. One of the experiments
will then come to your cabin and ask you to draw a chip out of a bag with 80 chips (which
are numbered 1 to 80). This chip will correspond to the task that you will be paid for. The
experiment will then enter the number of the chip on your screen and the computer will
automatically tell you, how much you earned in this task. Please ﬁll in this amount as well
as your name and signature the receipt that you ﬁnd on your desk. Afterwards, please raise
yourhandtosignaltheexperimentersthatyouareﬁnishedﬁllingoutyourreceipt. Afteryou
received your payment, the experiment is ﬁnished and you can leave the laboratory.
Thank you very much for participating in this experiment!
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Figure 9: Screenshot, 3-menu with a common standard and a selected offer
Figure 10: Screenshot, 6-menu without a common standard and a selected offer
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D.1 Shape comparison task
• Question 1 (one minute)
Howmanytimesbiggeristheareacoveredbytherectanglecomparedtotheareacovered
by the square?
• Question 2 (one minute)
Howmanytimesbiggeristheareacoveredbytherectanglecomparedtotheareacovered
by the circle?
• Question 3 (one minute)
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by the square?
• Question 4 (one minute)
How many times bigger is the area covered by the circle compared to the area covered by
the triangle?
D.2 Simple computations
Time given: 1 minute, allow for not answering some questions, put all questions at same
time to be answered in box next to each problem
• Question 1 (one minute)
88 – 45; 10 + 30; 57 – 43; 9 x 6; 3 x 7; 8 + 45; 65 – 11; 2 x 5; 8 + 12.
• Question 2 (one minute)
276 + 177; 12 / 4; 106 – 85; 18 / 6; 4 x 10; 188 – 64; 106 + 122; 8 x 7.
• Question 3 (one minute)
70/10; 892-179; 8*8; 363+93; 77/11; 9*5; 642-193; 265+108.
D.3 Problems
• Problem 1 (two minutes)
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• Problem 2 (two minutes)
A pizzeria serves two round pizzas of the same thickness in different sizes. The smaller one
has a diameter of 30 cm and costs 3 euros. The larger one has a diameter of 40 cm and costs
4 euros.
Which pizza is better value for money?
1. The smaller one
2. The larger one
3. Both are the same value for money
• Problem 3 (two minutes)
Nick wants to pave the rectangular patio of his new house. The patio has length 5 metres
andwidth3metres. Heneeds80brickspersquaremetre. HowmanybricksdoesNickneeds
for the whole patio?
• Problem 4 (two minutes)
You can buy $1.40 with one euro. How many dollars can you buy with 50 euros?
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